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For General Romeo Dallaire, whose valiant stand with 500 of his men saved the lives of
countless innocents in Kigali, Rwanda, 1994.
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Jean Kambanda sat quietly. The handsome forty-year old African was dressed in
his familiar dark blue jacket and azure grey tie. His hands were folded in a gesture
which, if not for the severity of the proceeding, might have been mistaken for
indifference. Behind plain black eyeglasses and an immaculate beard, his soft eyes
looked out with a professorial intensity. Legs crossed and reclining in his chair, he
looked more bemused than concerned. Indeed, he could have been lightly chiding a
young subordinate, or engrossed in an abstruse problem. There was an unmistakable air
of eloquence and dignity in his movements…a painful and tragic élan.
Jean Kambanda sat quietly in his chair, relaxed.
He waited to hear his sentence for the genocide of 800,000 of his people…
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Since it’s inception, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has
sought retribution for the victims of the Rwandan genocide. Throughout Africa and on
three continents, the ICTR searches for heads of government, soldiers, and state officials
who oversaw the worst genocide since Pol Pot’s Cambodia. Like Javert’s pursuit of Jean
Valjean, one man was foremost in their mind. The sole person at the helm of Rwanda’s
government during the horrific genocide of 1994. During his tenure, in the short span of
four months, over 800,000 men, women, and children were systematically and efficiently
exterminated. Death camps were revived and churches were burnt down upon the heads
of parishioners. Mass rape and the ex utero, a crime so deplorable that it was last
practiced upon Native Americans at Sand Creek, once again bloodied the Rwandan
landscape. When this bloodshed finally waned, to the shock of the international
community, the man quietly disappeared. He was Jean Kambanda, the Prime Minister of
Rwanda.
On the 9th of July in 1997, three years after the genocide, Jean Kambanda’s
haunted past returned with a vengeance. Following a seven week marathon stakeout
involving shadowy U.S. forces, Kenyan police and United Nations ICTR investigators,
over sixty armed men descended upon Nairobi in the dawn light, arresting Jean
Kambanda and six of his entourage in “Operation NIKI” (Nairobi-Kaligi), seven hundred
kilometers and two countries distant from Rwanda. Five days later, Kambanda was
transferred to the secure United Nations Detention facility in Arusha, Rwanda, there to
wait almost three months before the ICTR Prosecution team could prepare an indictment
against him.
On the 10th of October, ICTR document 97-23-I was confirmed by Judge Yakov
Ostrovsky. Kambanda was now to be held before the ICTR to answer for four of the most
serious international crimes; genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, complicity, and
crimes against humanity. Operation NIKI was a success.
Born in 1955 in the heart of Rwanda, Jean Kambanda is perhaps the most unlikely
genocidal dictator in modern history. Perpetually seen with a swarthy Quaker like beard
in archaic black plastic glasses, and a camoflauge jacket out of place with his urban chic
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attire, Kambanda seemed a part, but not the whole of the violent government. A father of
two children, Kambanda holds a degree in commercial engineering (banking) and began
his career as a banker in the Union des Banques Populaires du Rwanda (The BPR, a
Rwandan equivilant to the Bank of America). Proving highly skilled in this innocuous
fiscal talent, Kambanda rose to chair the BPR, making him an influential, but by no
means politically central figure. Never in the military, and without any formal political
training, the height of Kambanda’s political activity was his position as Vice-President of
the Butare section of the Mouvement Democratique Republique (MDR), the Tutsi ruling
party responsible for the genocidal atrocities. In this capacity, Kambanda’s power might
have been greater then it seemed. Though Butare is not the capital of the monarchy, it is
certainly the richest city in Rwanda, home to the National University, and is the ancient
capital of the Rwandan monarchy.
Following the assassination of the Prime Minister Agathe Uwiliyingimana in
April 1994,i Kambanda seemed to leapfrog several senior heads of the MDR
administration. Within days Kambanda was appointed the head of the Interim
Government of Rwanda, an institution similar to Vichy France which immediately
sanctioned the on-going massacres, and began devising new methods of ethnic cleansing.
Kambanda was whisked to the “Ecole Supeirieot Militaire” and “informed” of his
nomination.ii Perpetually surrounded by a vanguard of Rwandan security forces, the
formally quiet Kambanda proved a political natural…strumming up the youth militia and
openly aggravating an already dangerous situation.
It was Jean Kambanda who masterminded the horrific three month Tutsi genocide
of 1994 and ordered the holocaust in the Tutsi sanctuary of the Church of St. Jean. It was
Kambanda who drew upon the vitality of the Interahamwe, an emotionally charged youth
militia modeled after the Nazi Youth Corps. It was Kambanda’s voice which soon echoed
throughout the land on Radio Television Mille Libres, inciting ethnic violence and hatred.
And it was Kambanda’s bastion of history, intelligence, and popularity in Butare which
proved decisive in the oncoming bloodshed.
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And then…almost as quickly, Jean Kambanda vanished. Following the fortunate
take over of Kigali by the war hardened RPF guerillas (the last bastion of moderate arms
in Rwanda), the genocidal administration fled. Many first-world nations, Kenya and
Cameroon among them, undoubtedly played host to their unwelcome and unknown
visitors. Just as the upper echelon of Nazi leaders had fled in the aftermath of World War
II, the vast body of leaders, scholars and soldiers responsible for the genocide left
Rwanda, vanishing amidst the millions of refugees.
This paper is an epilogue of the story of Jean Kambanda. As first and foremost a
legal discussion, it analyzes whether Kambanda’s right to counsel was violated. In this
regard, this paper compares the provisions of the right to counsel in the United States,
and the ICTR. Secondly, as a critical essay, this paper queries whether Jean Kambanda’s
conviction was a result of political expediency. Was Kambanda immolated in the pyre of
international relations, a sacrificial lamb to repair the waning power and legitimacy of the
ICTR ? Finally, as a historical narrative, this paper is an analysis of the inconsistencies
which plagued the International Criminal Tribunal from his arrest in Nairobi, till the
passionate argument of his final counsel in the Appeals chamber of Judge Claude Jorda.
Prior to this layman’s project, the aforementioned questions were, throughout
Kambanda’s appeal, thrown back and forth in academic literature like a dancer’s pas de
deux. That was almost four and a half years ago. Today, as the ICTR begins the process
of finalizing it’s case load and preparing a termination strategy, the story of Jean
Kambanda is largely forgotten. No images of his face, nor press releases proclaiming his
innocence are published. His image no longer adorns the billboards in Rwanda, and
crowds do not protest outside the ICTR anymore. One wonders if these questions are
thought of at all.
Alone with his thoughts, Jean Kambanda has had seven years, six days, and
sixteen hours to think about them.
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2. The Right to Counsel in the United States.
a.

History.

In the United States of America, the Constitution guarantees the right to counsel
through the Fifth, Sixth Amendments, and Fourteenth Amendments. Yet the modern right
to counsel is an outgrowth of interpretation, and not a result of substantive provisions.
The layman citizen may erroneously believe that for every criminal defendant, an
attorney must be appointed or provided. Strictly speaking, the Constitution guarantees no
such right. The constitutional right to counsel is only a fallback provision…a legal
failsafe which historically intended to prevent only the most egregious “railroading” of a
criminal proceeding strictly within the federal system. The words of the Sixth amendment
actually refer to counsel almost in passing, and are the only mention of counsel anywhere
in the Constitution.



In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district
shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of counsel for his defense

The right to counsel as we know it was not always so. The positive right to
counsel truly emerged in the post-Gideon era of the early 1960’s, following the landmark
case of Gideon v. Wainwright,iv and it’s later Juvenile corollary, In Re Gault.v Heretofore,
felony adult counsel was only constitutionally mandated in the much smaller Federal
system through the strictest interpretation of the Sixth Amendment.vi As late as the
1930’s, counsel was regularly being denied in capital cases,vii and virtually non-existent
to state indigent defendants.viii In 1942 the infamous Betts v. Brady case, in which Smith
Betts was charged, tried, and convicted of robbery without assistance of counsel, was
affirmed by the US Supreme Court. ix For a time, Betts halted the preliminary forays into
a Constitutionally mandated right to counsel.x
Some twenty years later, Clarence Gideon broke into a ramshackle pool hall in
Panama City, whose owner, by an odd quirk of fate, was named Strickland.xi Convicted
8

without counsel, Gideon brought a writ in forma pauperis to the US Supreme Court,
eventuating the now famous Gideon v. Wainwright decision. Under the masterful
advocacy of Abe Fortas, whom Deputy Attorney General Bruce Jacob, then a very
youthful twenty-seven year old, referred to as both “grave” and “charming”, Gideon
eviscerated the Betts decision, creating a de facto right to counsel in state felony cases,
and by implication all capital cases throughout the nation.xii
From the rationale applied in Gideon v. Wainwright, it was but a legal stonesthrow away to the modern-day doctrine of Argersinger v. Hamlin.xiii Indeed, as stated in
Argersinger, the United States Supreme Court had already incorporated more and more
of the 6th Amendment through the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause.xiv Five years
after Gideon, the court held in Duncan v. Louisiana, that a jury-trial was fundamental to
Due Process under the 6th Amendment.xv Duncan, a young black teen had received two
months in prison for “slapping” a white teenager on the elbow in a short and perfunctory
bench trial.xvi A year before, in Washington v. Texas, the Court had struck down a
Washington statute forbidding a Criminal defendant to cross-examine his co-conspirators
as invalid under the Confrontation Clause.xvii Little was left of the 6th amendment to
incorporate except of course, the bulk of the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases.
In 1972, just nine years after Gideon v. Wainwright, Justice Douglas wrote in
Argersinger v. Hamlin that;



…absent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any
offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial.xviii
Jon Argersinger, an indigent of Leon County, Florida had actually not received a

sentence of imprisonment per se, but a $500 dollar fine with the key provision that upon
default, he was to be held for six months in custody.xix Being indigent, he could not
afford and attorney and of course, could not afford to pay the fine. As a result,
Argersinger was immediately placed into custody. Roughly eight days after he was
arrested, Argersinger’s Public Defender submitted a Habeas Corpus brief to the Supreme
Court of Florida which, surprisingly, was immediately disposed of and resulted in his
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release on bond. However, following a negative opinion three months later, the now
thoroughly confused Argersinger was remanded into custody.
The opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Argersinger was slightly
problematic. While critical of the lack of counsel and lauded by the defense bar, it also
left the door open to exceptions in the instances of fine, acquittal, or non-custodial
sentencing.xx The end result was that Argersinger required that counsel be appointed in
the vast majority of misdemeanor cases where imprisonment was in fact sought, or
practically, possible.xxi Should a prosecutor seek imprisonment, the accused MUST have
a counsel or a successful trial would be for naught. Should he actually receive
imprisonment, counsel was undeniable. The court would earmark this rationale in Scott v.
Illinois, as the basic moyens vivre for right to counsel jurisprudence.xxii Counsel in
felonies and capital cases counsel continued to be automatic.xxiii In misdemeanors, should
imprisonment occur counsel must have been supplied.xxiv The basic framework of this
rule, in it’s entirety has not changed drastically in the past three decades.

b. Philosophy and Key Provisions of the American Right to Counsel.
Attorneys, lawyers, or their counterparts, have existed since the early fifth century
B.C.xxv The notion that all who desire it may have someone more versed or eloquent
speak on their behalf is a concept which dates centuries before Christ, and is even
paralleled in the Old Testament. God himself was fond of attorneys it seemed, as he
instructed Moses to defer his own rather inadequate public speaking to his more
loquacious relative Aaron.xxvi However while the concept of “counsel” pervaded Western
thought since the time of Pliny, the natural corollary of “appointed counsel” is a
relatively new and amorphous philosophical concept. Indeed, in Ancient Greece, the
opposite was true. Every Greek citizen was both a policeman and a prosecutor, and the
arrester was also required to prosecute the case.xxvii
In the United States, the right to counsel is by no means static, and is limited by
American case law. Two forms of counsel right exist. The primary doctrine under the
sixth amendment requires counsel to be present at any “critical stage” of a criminal
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proceeding, and upon the commencement of adversarial judicial proceedings.xxviii Though
offense-specific,xxix the Sixth Amendment right to counsel stems directly from the words
of the Constitution itself and operates in a variety of circumstances. Within the context of
a “critical stage” judicial proceedings are irrelevant. For instance, in Escobedo v. Illinois,
the Supreme Court held that where a murder suspect was arrested, brought to a police
station, denied access to his lawyer and his lawyer’s requests to see his client were
studiously ignored, a Sixth amendment violation occurred, despite the lack of an actual
indictment.xxx Vice versa, the Sixth Amendment also creates a threshold at the
commencement of adversarial judicial proceedings. This concept of “attachment”
discussed in Kirby v. Illinois,xxxi creates an mandatory attorney threshold after which
Counsel must be present or appointed.xxxii Following the indictment of a criminal
defendant, one must have counsel.xxxiii By the same token, following the termination of
adversarial judicial proceedings theoretically counsel may no longer required, leading
many academics to raise the question of whether parole hearing counsel is actually
Constitutionally mandated.xxxiv The more immediate question of appellate counsel has
already been addressed. In Douglas v. California, the Supreme Court held that indigent
defendants have an absolute right to an appellate counsel in the first instance,xxxv yet their
opinion did not touch upon the more complex problem of an indigent’s infinite right to
appellate counsel. In any event the Sixth amendment right is a two-pronged positivist
approach to attorneys. An indigent is entitled to counsel in any of two circumstances, first
upon the commencement of an indictment, and secondly at any critical stage of the
proceedings.
The second doctrine of counsel under the Fifth Amendment, is a prophylactic, or
a protective and preventive rule.xxxvi The famous Miranda v. Arizona decision draws
upon the due process imperatives of the 5th amendment right against selfincrimination.xxxvii Under the Miranda rule, the Fifth Amendment bars any evidence from
“custodial interrogation” after an accused has been denied access to his attorney, or has
failed to be informed of his Miranda right to counsel.xxxviii However, it operates only in
extremely limited circumstances, and frequently succumbs to the very nature of police
expediency. For instance, where police officers had arrested a suspect, and began
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(innocently?) to discuss the horrific dangers of leaving a loaded firearm within reach of a
nearby school for disabled children, followed by the previously intransigent suspect
confessing to the location of a shotgun, the Supreme Court held that this was not an
“interrogation”, despite it’s obvious ulterior motives.xxxix
The fifth and sixth amendment may operate independently, simultaneously, or not
at all through a client’s waiver. The crux of these rights is that at certain pre-adjudicative
stages counsel may be present, namely custodial interrogation. However practically,
Miranda is an ex post facto rule. It operates as an exclusionary rule after a constitutional
violation has occurred. Indeed, it would be a strange police officer who volunteered to
halt the interrogation and continue while counsel is present.
The Philosophical rationale behind the right to counsel has been touched upon
mainly by the courts. The general consensus is that society is not willing to bear the costs
to legitimacy and fairness resulting from a lack of counsel.xl While judicially and
politically expedient, the right to counsel is described as “fundamental” to our legal
system.xli Put another way, in the short run counsel could be sacrificed in terms of
expediency, but the long lasting effects upon the legitimacy and infrastructure of the
judiciary would be irreparable and disastrous.xlii In France and Germany, this rationale
has been described as a simultaneous public interest to ensure that the legitimacy of the
legal system is sacrosanct.xliii In the economic sense, this public interest in legitimacy
coincides with the defendant’s interest to have a fair trial, in the same way a ship
captain’s interest in a lighthouse coincides with a seaport’s interest in uninterrupted trade.
Philosophical rationales from the international perspective are scarce in academic
literature. It is somewhat difficult for Americans to comprehend that in the vast majority
of the world counsel is not provided, or differs from the United States defense counsel
paradigm. In Europe, counsel was being provided some time before Gideon was born.xliv
In many circumstances, foreign legal systems without transpositions of the American
counsel right function, albeit with a more Draconian overtones, rather expediently.xlv It is
also difficult for Western scholars to understand that in many nations and cultures,
criticism of the indigenous legal system (which in many instances predates the United
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States in general by several centuries), is considered bad form.xlvi China’s legal system,
for example, bears strong relationship to the Ancient Tang Legal Code, an era of Chinese
history which is viewed with great pride and reverence.xlvii In France, the judge may
routinely step into the role of counsel and examine a witness, or conduct independent
investigations.xlviii In the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, a nation with “most-favored nation
status”, there actually is no counsel system at all, and the courts are based upon the
ancient Islamic sharia’a tribunal.xlix Vice versa in France and Germany, the wish of the
defendant to proceed pro persona, is irrelevant. A defendant is not only appointed but
required to have an attorney in his criminal proceeding.l
This brief diatribe describes some of the inherent problems in comparing the right
to counsel. However comparison by itself is always helpful…as it allows the researcher
to better understand his own system, as well as another. The adage of Nosce te ipsum,
Know Thyself, coined by the famous lawyer Socrates,li refers not to self-awareness but to
understanding of others, and indeed, a cavalier disdain for oneself. This is the essence of
comparativism, not without a certain tragic irony that Socrates himself, was convicted
and sentenced to death pro per.
3. The Right to Counsel in the ICTR.
a.

Substantive Provisions.

The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda is governed by a statute enacted
under the auspices of Security Council Resolution 955 in 1994.lii This statute, in addition
to laying out the general order of the Tribunal and it’s mission, guarantees the right of
counsel under Article 20(4)(d).liii The relevant language of this article states;



4. In the determination of any charge against the accused pursuant to the present
Statute, the accused shall be entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full
equality:…
…(d)To be tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself or herself in person
or through legal assistance of his or her own choosing; to be informed, if he or
she does not have legal assistance, of this right; and to have legal assistance
assigned to him or her, in any case where the interests of justice so require, and
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without payment by him or her in any such case if he or she does not have
sufficient means to pay for it;liv

The right to counsel is also supplemented through Article 2 of the “Directive on
the Assignment of Defense Counsel”,lv in a codification similar to the United States
Miranda rule. However unlike Miranda, Article 2 applies to any person detained upon the
authority of the Tribunal. The detainee need not be an accused, but may also be merely a
suspect of an investigation, or even a potential witness.lvi Article 2 is a sweeping rule
reaching beyond the Miranda doctrine, and allows counsel in myriad situations involving
police or prosecutor interrogations. The actual language of Article 2 reads as follows;
(A) Without prejudice to the right of an accused to conduct his own Defence, a
suspect who is to be questioned by the Prosecutor during an investigation and an
accused upon whom personal service of the indictment has been effected shall
have the right to be assisted by Counsel provided that he has not expressly waived
his right to Counsel.
(B) Any person detained on the authority of the Tribunal, including any person
detained in accordance with Rule 90 bis, also has the right to be assisted by
Counsel provided that the person has not expressly waived his right to Counsel.
(C) All references in this Directive to suspects or accused shall also be
understood to apply to any persons detained on the authority of the Tribunal.lvii

Finally, Rule 65 of the “Rules Covering Detention of Persons Awaiting Trial or
Appeal” specifically delineates the absolute right to have contact with counsel while
incarcerated.lviii Like similar provisions in United States state prisons, and particularly the
federal regulatory code relating to the right of counsel within the federal prison system,lix
Rule 65 grasps the fundamental principle that access to counsel within detention is just as
paramount as access in a court setting.
b. In Practice.
‘Legal assistance’, obviously refers to the assistance of a competent general
counsel versed in international or domestic criminal defense. However certain
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implications arise in the context of the ICTR not paralleled in domestic case law. The
traditional requirement of admission to a state bar would seem woefully inadequate
within the context of a genocide trial. At least in the United States, all lawyers duly
admitted to the bar are deemed to have the requisite knowledge, or be able to attain the
requisite knowledge, to litigate any potential case.lx The ICTR, of course, differs in this
assessment. Like an attorney who owes a duty of candor both to his client and the court,
the ICTR has dual duties to the people of Rwanda, as well as the defendants before it’s
auspices.lxi In response the ICTR has implemented several procedures ensuring that
appointed counsel is adequately trained to litigate on an indigent’s behalf.
Article 13 of the Directive on Defense Counsel requires that appointed counsel be
duly admitted to a bar for at least 10 years, speak either English or French (in most cases
it behooves the attorney to speak both in addition to Kinyarwande and Swahili), and
appear before the Tribunal prior to appointment.lxii Form IL2, utilized as the preliminary
screening for defense counsel by the Office of the Registrar, also requires the counsel-tobe to list his relevant experience in Criminal Law, International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights.lxiii
The process for being called to the bar of the International Tribunal is actually
relatively simple. Counsel submits his Form IL2 and supporting documents, which, if
found sufficient, are accepted by the ICTR Registry. From there his name, curriculum
vitae, expertise and nationality are placed on a Defense Counsel list. This list of various
Defense counsel represents the major legal systems of the world.lxiv Additionally, the list
also comprises both Practitioners in International law, domestic criminal defense lawyers,
local attorneys, and academics. The defendant selects his counsel from the list and
forwards this information to the Registrar. At that point the Registrar may appoint an
indigent defendant’s selected counsel, deny him the right to counsel, or appoint him a
temporary counsel for one month. However, as stated by United Nations Press Release,
several inconsistencies arise. Foremost is the fact that an organ of the court is selecting an
accused counsel for him, creating a rarely publicized conflict of interest. Secondly, the
Registrar of the ICTR is under orders to assign counsel prudently with regard to cost !lxv
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Cost is an interesting issue in and of itself. The ICTR Registry has been quoted as
budgeting an approximate total of 5 million dollars for defense counsel fees.lxvi By
comparison, Professor Richard Dieter of the Death Penalty Information Center has
testified that in Texas, it costs approximately 2.3 million dollars to run a capital case,lxvii
and in at least one case, the costs of mounting a favorable capital defense reached 2.9
million dollars.lxviii Obviously the ICTR is not Texas, but a much more complex forum.
The inadequacies of 5 million dollars are obvious and striking.
In practice the assigned counsel system has led to substantial confusion. The most
publicized and embarrassing occurrence took place when the astoundingly inept Court
Administrator Dr. Agwu Okali, in a botched attempt to geographically balance the
Defense Counsel list, placed an arbitrary moratorium upon French and Canadian
lawyers.lxix Dr. Okali of course overlooked the fact that both countries happen to be the
largest French speaking nations in the world.lxx This startling unilateral advance of
geopolitical Affirmative Action by Dr. Okali was described by Professor David Tolbert,
the former Chef de Cabinet to the President of the ICTY and his senior legal advisor, as
both “arbitrary” and “nonsense”.lxxi
This situation reached a head following a detainee hunger strike led by former
teacher and bourgmestre Jean Paul Akeyasu.lxxii In response, (and not a little bit
abashedly) Dr. Okali, bowing to both internal and international pressure, ceased his
moratorium. The Okali-led affirmative action plan died quickly, Akeyasu and his cohorts
began eating, and the Defense Counsel list currently includes Nicolas Tiangaye of the
Central African Republic, Patrice Monthe of Cameroon, Johan Scheers of Belgium, and
David Hooper for the United Kingdom. The ICTR however, never truly recovered from
this piercing loss of legitimacy.
Within such a small tribunal such as the ICTR, there is generally very little room
for mistakes of great significance. Certainly no defendant has ever been without counsel
as a result of a clerical error, as has happened frequently in United States courts, and
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continues to this day. With only fifty-five defendants and twenty-one of the most skilled
legal scholars in the world as Judges, mistakes are few and far between. Questions, if
they arise, are usually constrained to the law. The crux of this paper is where these two
issues collide, the right to counsel as a matter of law, and how far it comparably stretches
within the political practices of the ICTR adversely effected the Trial of Jean Kambanda.
In most nations which involve an appointed counsel system, (the United States
and the United Kingdom for example), the indigent defendant may not pick and choose
his attorney.lxxiii He may discharge an attorney at his own behest, but the arbitrary
selection of defense counsel is prohibited. These concerns generally arise within the
context of an indigent defendant vociferously (but perhaps not unreasonably) requesting a
counsel of his own race. An indigent defendant generally has no right to a certain
counsel, but simply counsel in and of himself.lxxiv In that respect, the ICTR differs from
the norm. An indigent defendant personally selects his or her own lawyer from a list of
several hundred highly qualified lawyers representing the major legal systems of the
world.lxxv It is then the Registrar’s determination whether or not the selection will be
appointed.
This departure from the norm has led to some legal confusion. Jean Paul Akeyasu,
a teacher and convicted genocidal leader, selected a counsel from the list which was not
granted. On appeal, he argued that his denial of specific counsel was tantamount to denial
of counsel in it’s entirety. This logic was dealt with at length by the appellate chamber,
holding that a balance must be struck between a defendant’s “right to counsel of his own
choosing” and tribunal resources.lxxvi The court held that an indigent defendant has no
right to “specific counsel” despite the choice implied in selection, but rather is only
entitled to counsel in it’s most general meaning.
4. Jean Kambanda’s Counsel.
The context in which counsel was finally appointed to Jean Kambanda are
complex. Following his arrest in July and for the nine months following, Jean Kambanda
communicated to the Registry that he did not seek legal counsel, though he would request
it if it became truly necessary. The decision to proceed pro persona, within the vast body
17

of criminal law, is a weighty one and almost always recorded within the trial transcript.
Certainty when an attorney is involved in a limited sense, as here, the decision to proceed
pro persona raises several attorney duties independent of the client’s wishes.lxxvii Indeed,
in many countries including the United States, a decision to proceed pro per must be
acknowledged by the court at the outset.lxxviii The ICTR has a similar procedure known as
“Renonciation temporaire au droit à l’assistance d’un conseil de la defense,” literally
translated a “Temporary Renunciation of the Right of Assistance of Counsel. This
document Kambanda signed following a communication to the Register in October, but is
not noted in the Trial Court opinion.lxxix
Given the relative important of a pro per decision, one might imagine it would be
duly recorded. Yet in Trial Chamber judgment it is completely ignored. There is no legal,
nor practical explanation of this oversight. Indeed, if one were to simply read the opinion,
it would be difficult, if not impossible, to infer that Jean Kambanda had appeared not
once, but twice before the ICTR pro per, and had signed a waiver of counsel rights. The
entire procedural history as redacted by Judge Kama contains no hint of the lack of
counsel;



1. Jean Kambanda was arrested by the Kenyan authorities,…on 9 July 1997…
On 16 July 1997, Judge Laïty Kama, …ordered the transfer and provisional
detention of the suspect Jean Kambanda at the Detention Facility of the Tribunal
for a period of thirty days, pursuant to Rule 40 bis of the Rules. …
2. On 16 October 1997, an indictment against the suspect Jean Kambanda,
prepared by the Office of the Prosecutor, was submitted to Judge Yakov
Ostrovsky, who confirmed it, issued a warrant of arrest against the accused and
ordered his continued detention.
3. On 1 May 1998, during his initial appearance before this Trial Chamber, the
accused pleaded guilty to the six counts contained in the indictment, …lxxx
This could, potentially be explained away if a pro per decision is recorded at some

later stage in the opinion. However in the entire judgment of the Trial Chamber, the
decision to proceed pro per is never recorded, and Kambanda’s objections to the new
counsel never noted. The Trial Chamber, records only a short discussion of Kambanda’s
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“unequivocallness” of his “guilty plea”. As Professor Russell-Brown noted in her
discussion of Kajelijeli, for almost 147 days Kajelijeli was without counsel in flagrant
violation of international law.lxxxi Consider then, that Jean Kambanda, perhaps the most
culpable of defendants, was without counsel for almost four months !
The appeals chamber, in stark contrast stated;
Between 18 July 1997, the date of his arrest, and March 1998, the Appellant did
not wish to be represented by counsel, reserving his right to such assistance until
he expressly said that he felt it necessary. On 11 August 1997, in a letter to
the Registry, he declared that he wished to waive his right to be represented by
counsel, which waiver he confirmed verbally during the Trial Chamber hearings
on 14 August and 16 September 1997. On 18 October 1997, the Appellant
submitted a document entitled "Renonciation temporaire au droit à l’assistance
d’un conseil de la défense" (Temporary Waiver of My Right to Defence Counsel),
in which he once again confirmed his waiver in writing.lxxxii
The appeals chamber further noted that following the plea agreement, he appeared
before the chamber three times without assistance of counsel, totaling five times he had
appeared pro per before the Trial chamber.
Throughout this process, Kambanda alleged that though he repeatedly requested
Counsel Sheers,lxxxiii and the Registry insisted upon assigning him a little known
Cameroonian Defense Counsel named Oliver Michael Inglis.lxxxiv Little information is
available regarding his selection, though in a later appellate opinion Kambanda would
allege that Inglis, a Cameroonian Defense counsel, had been a friend of the Deputy
Prosecutor for over thirty years.lxxxv It was under Inglis’s counsel that Kambanda pled
guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment, the most severe punishment the ICTR
may confer.
5. Jean Kambana’s Plea – The Trouble with Inglis.
a. The Plea.
A plea of guilty in the ICTR is generally considered a mitigating circumstance for
the purposes of sentencing.lxxxvi A rapid plea of guilty at the outset of litigation, which
gives no inference of strategy by the accused to secure the “best of a bad situation” is
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considered even more mitigating.lxxxvii Indeed, in many instances such a plea might be
one of the final shreds of hope for an ICTR defendant. The ICTR has, after all, far out
shadowed its predecessor the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia in severe
sentences.lxxxviii More practically the Rwandan Gacaca courts (domestic tribal versions of
the ICTR), found that a rapid guilty plea within the context of genocide ameliorates the
obviously abrasive racial environment, as well as overcoming evidence problems in the
post-genocide era.lxxxix
Eulogies of guilty plea’s aside, the western procedure of pleading guilty has long
been criticized in domestic academe as inept and dictatorial.xc Such claims rise to a new
level of severity when litigated in the context of elite legal fora, such as the ICTR. Pleas
in international law are of far greater import, and their effects upon sentencing more
profound than in the domestic arena. As aforementioned, a swift and painless guilty plea
may be the last weapon a defendant has against the scathing wrath of an angry chambers.
Rule 62 of ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence governs the legal sanctity of
pleas.xci It parallels the general school of thought regarding pleas, which hold that for a
plea to survive appellate review, it must be free and voluntary, unequivocal, informed,
and based on sufficient facts. This four pronged test requires each element to verified in
open court by the Trial Chambers, through a semi-interrogative questioning by the
Chamber Judges. This verification is outlined in Rule 62(v),xcii and was carried out in
Jean Kambanda’s trial, but also notably in the plea of Omar Serushago, the violent
Interahamwe squad leader in Gisenyi.xciii .
The plea of Jean Kambanda, as opined by the trial court, was verified by Judge
Kama.xciv Though descriptive of the questions and affirmative answers, no explicit
language save the Trial Court’s actual verdict of “guilty” was mentioned in the opinion.
The courts complete discussion of the incident consists of the following;


The Chamber, nevertheless, sought to verify the validity of the guilty plea. To this
end, the Chamber asked the accused:
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(i) if his guilty plea was entered voluntarily, in other words, if he did so
freely and knowingly, without pressure, threats, or promises;
(ii) if he clearly understood the charges against him as well as the
consequences of his guilty plea; and
(iii) if his guilty plea was unequivocal, in other words, if he was aware
that the said plea could not be refuted by any line of defence.
7. The accused replied in the affirmative to all these questions. On the
strength of these answers, the Chamber delivered its decision from the
bench as follows:
"Mr. Jean Kambanda, having deliberated and after verifying that your
plea of guilty is voluntary, unequivocal and that you clearly understand its
terms and consequences,…xcv

So far, so good. Little dispute exists over a recorded interrogation by the eminent
jurist Laity Kama.xcvi Justice Kama goes on to discuss some of the underlying principles
of international law, and the statutory framework of the tribunal, before beginning to
discuss the case in earnest.xcvii The crux of this paper emerges when Laity Kama begins to
discuss the plea agreement and affidavit signed by Kambanda and his Counsel Inglis. The
Trial records that this document entitled “Plea Agreement between Jean Kambanda and
the OTP” was signed on April 28th 1998.xcviii However, the Appeals Judgment notes that,
at the earliest, Kambanda did not have ANY counsel until the 25th of March, 1998,xcix
only thirty-four days before the plea agreement was signed, and just twenty-four working
days before the plea agreement was signed with Counsel Inglis. Thus Jean Kambanda not
only agreed to a plea stratagem (which was obviously unsuccessful), assembled a plea
agreement, and conducted relatively complex crisis bargaining having a lawyer for the
grand total of less than four weeks.
On the 4th of September 1998, just six months after he had been appointed
counsel, Jean Kambanda was sentenced to life in prison by a unanimous panel of Judge
Laity Kama, Judge Lennart Aspegren, and Judge Navanethem Pillay.
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b.

The Trouble with Inglis.

This paper does not dwell upon the strategic and tactical inadequacies of Counsel
Inglis’ crisis bargaining. Whether Inglis was simply confused the day he signed an
Affidavit condemning his client to die in prison, or malicious, is irrelevant. The core
issue is that Kambanda’s appointed Defense counsel signed an affidavit which proved the
Prosecution’s case. Among the more damning things the affidavit discussed were relived
by Judge Kama in his opinion;
Jean Kambanda acknowledges that as Prime Minister of the Interim Government
of Rwanda from 8 April 1994 to 17 July 1994, he…exercised de jure and de facto
authority over senior civil servants and senior officers in the military…c
Jean Kambanda acknowledges that on 3 May 1994, he was personally asked to
take steps to protect children who had survived the massacre at a hospital and he
did not respond. On the same day, after the meeting, the children were killed. He
acknowledges that he failed in his duty to ensure the safety of the children and the
population of Rwanda…ci
Both of these affirmations indicate that Kambanda and his Counsel not only
agreed to factual conclusions but legal conclusions as well. Counsel Inglis essentially
allowed the Prosecutor to prove their case before it began. For example, the legal
conclusion of de jure and de facto authority, by its very nature, is an incredibly complex
litigation and not one which can be sidestepped at the outset by a mere signed document.
Yet Inglis’s damage was far from done.
In the Pre-sentencing transcript of Jean Kambanda, the Trial Prosecutor stated
clearly that “We believe that this offence merits nothing less than the maximum,
maximum punishment”.cii The keystone of the Prosecutor’s argument was the damning
admissions made by Jean Kambanda in his affidavit. However following direct
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questioning by Judge Muna into the Accused’s cooperative nature the Prosecutor
responded to interrogation with a startling admission;
“ JUDGE PILLAY: My interest is not what he told you in confidence or what
your informers told you. I am interested in whether the accused made any public
statement speaking out on the truth of the events in Rwanda.
MR. MUNA: Not to my knowledge, not to my knowledge, Your Honour.”
Thus the senior prosecutor, responsible for eulogizing Kambanda’s cooperation
and admissions, was unable to cite any public statements by Kambanda to that effect.
To complicate matters further, Counsel Inglis’s own pre-sentencing statements dwelled
upon myriad factors which, if not for his preliminary admission of guilty, might well
have functioned as affirmative defenses. Inglis’ argument that Kambanda may have been
coerced to become Prime Minister, and was continually surrounded by a vanguard of
armed Defense ministry bodyguards isolating him from private contact, might have
played well in a Trial setting.ciii Yet this directly contradicted the affirmation which Inglis
himself had signed. Thus the confused Chambers were, on the one hand, confronted with
a signed affidavit indicating de jure authority but simultaneously met with Counsel Inglis
counter-vailing argument of coercion.
In the most bizarre of his statements, Inglis began quoting laudatory letters from
genocide survivors, including a self-stylized fan who was “a collector on autographs of
persons who really have done something positive for their people and the future of
mankind.” The most frank determination of Counsel Inglis’s obvious inept manner may
be had from a short transcript of the first question Judge Pillay asked of him;
JUDGE PILLAY: Mr. Inglis, you refer in your brief to a document that you say
the accused wrote in November,1995, in Nairobi.
MR. INGLIS: Pardon?
JUDGE PILLAY: I am referring to your brief.
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MR. INGLIS: Yes?
JUDGE PILLAY: In which you are-- make mention of a document written by the
accused in November'95 you say called-- well it is a document about peace and
reconciliation in Rwanda. Do you know that? It is in your brief here, I am
referring to-- do you want the page, page 4?
MR. INGLIS: Yes.
JUDGE PILLAY: But you didn't puts up this document and you don't tell us
anything about the contents of that document, and you don't tell us why the
Chamber should somehow take that into consideration as mitigatory so if
we don't know, if we don't know the contents of the documents, we can only
speculate on its contents. It may be another-- is it another plan for genocide or is
it some exciting plan for peace? So if you are a position can you tell us, give us
some idea of what the accused's positionis with regards to peace and
reconciliationin Rwanda and how-- and whether he sees anyrole for himself in the
process of peace and reconciliation in Rwanda?
MR. INGLIS: What role he played?
JUDGE PILLAY: So that's my one question in relation to this document and the
accused's thoughts on peace and reconciliation in Rwanda and whether he sees
any role for himself in that? So that's the one part of my question and the other
is can you explain how a prison sentence of 2 years is going to help the healing
process?

As the pre-sentencing hearing progressed, it became apparent that Counsel Inglis
was defending Kambanda through allegations of coercion and a “puppet” government.
However defense in a pre-sentencing hearing is to no avail. Having been convicted of
genocide, Kambanda was in a position analogous to that of an In-Custody Felony
Defendant in a California Arraignment (Where the Judge must, without regard to
defenses or allegations, assume the crime is true). Affirmative defenses or pleas of
diminished capacity are extraneous in a pre-sentencing hearing. Yet Inglis had one final
card up his sleeve.
In a final surreal, if not Charles Dodson-esque bit of advocacy,civ Counsel Inglis
cited the Ugandan Penal Code. The crux of his argument was that if Uganda mitigated
capital punishments to five years, and life imprisonment to two years, could not the ICTR
accept the same rationale ? Thus Inglis implicitly argued that Kambanda could, plausibly,
receive the same punishment for multiple genocide convictions as if he sold 16 ounces of
marijuana in Salt Lake City, Utah.cv Consider the obviously estranged statement;
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The case now before your Trial Chamber is repeat [replete] with mitigating
factors that tell in favour of a sentence of two years, two years imprisonment, if
you follow the general practice regarding prison sentences in Rwanda in the
interest of justice and with a view to reconciliation among the people
This statement, which found it’s basis in Article 83 of the Ugandan Penal Code,
neglected to mention that Uganda was not replete (forgive the pun) with judicial
legitimacy itself. Having survived it’s own horrific genocide at the hands of Idi Amin,
and led by the dictator-President Lt. Gen. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni (who appoints the
entire judiciary), Uganda’s legal system would, in the layman’s view, have been a
second-string choice for citation in a pre-sentencing hearing on genocide.
Kambanda’s plea was accepted. The Trial Court, sentenced Kambanda to life
imprisonment on the 4th of September 1998, six years ago.
6. The Appeal.
a.

Prelude.

Four days after sentence was passed, Kambanda filed a notice of appeal through
his erstwhile Counsel Inglis.cvi Four days after this notice, Kambanda applied to dismiss
Inglis, and change his defense counsel.cvii At some point later, (the appeals judgment is
unclear) Counsel was substituted, and Kambanda was appointed a new defense counsel in
the form of Tjarda Eduard van der Spoel and Gerard Mols, both experienced attorneys
who has since appeared in both the ICTR and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Yugoslavia. Within weeks a solidified appeal was lodged, alleging incompetence of
counsel, denial of the right to counsel, and a motion to set aside the plea of guilty and
request a new trial.
At the outset, it appeared that Tjarda van der Spoel was undoubtedly a more
expert counsel.cviii Unlike the rather passive Mr. Inglis, whose ill fated plea bargain led to
Kambanda’s life sentence, Tjarda Van der Spoel proved a different animal. Van Der
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Spoel’s defense team immediately began appellate skirmishes with the Prosecutors,
supplanting motions with further motions eventually running into the hundreds of pages.
There were, the appellate court noted with a twinge of chagrin, appendices to motions
which ran into the hundreds of pages.cix These appendices were, of course, met with equal
literary vehemence by the Prosecutor’s office, which began a campaign to bolster the
Kambanda judgment. At a certain point, there were three reply’s to a single document, a
treatise awkwardly entitled A “Reply to the Prosecutor’s Response on the Appellant’s
Brief of 2nd of May 2000”.cx
In the final analysis, Kamanda’s eight count appeal of the Trial Court Judgment
was an indictment of the ICTR itself. In the brief span of three pages, Van der Spoel
argued that the Trial Chamber denied Kambanda his right to counsel, did not investigate
the plea thoroughly, based the plea itself on an insufficient factual basis, illegally
detained Kambanda outside the Arusha complex, and failed whatsoever to analyze the
guilty plea as a mitigating circumstance.cxi The crux of this appeal revolved around Inglis
and the Trial Chamber itself. Van der Spoel’s appeal was a condemnation of the
proceedings and a blunt analogy to the Trial Chamber of the ICTR as a politically
motivated lynch-mob. Van der Spoel harped upon the right to counsel, arguing that the
Registry denied him the right to Counsel Sheers, intentionally substituting the inept
Inglis.
The severity of the allegations were such that the Prosecution itself filed an
Objection to the right-to-counsel arguments,cxii and the Registry (in an unprecedented and
subjective amicus) filed a “Reply” against Van der Spoel’s allegations.cxiii Never in the
history of the ICTR had the Registry sought to intervene in the Criminal process, and it
has never sought intervention since. Van der Spoel’s allegations threatened Registrar
Okali’s very legitimacy, and sensing his own power was becoming suspect, Okali lashed
out as only a threatened tyrant can. Okali’s own legal vanguard actually moved the
Appeals Chamber to dismiss Kambanda’s case on the basis that appointment of a counsel
is not an justiciable legal stance.cxiv This legal posture and presence, unheard of in
modern international law, continues to undermine the Registers own objectivity. Okali,
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inept himself, also created an embarrassing situation again by appearing highly subjective
in his ostensibly non-legal position. The entire affair was equivalent to a Federal Court
Clerk functioning as an ex officio state amicus for a United States Attorney.
In October of 2000, many replies, counter-replies, and objections later, the
appeals court under the deific figure of Justice Jorda,cxv disposed of the appeals grounds
and affirmed the judgment of the Trial court. Citing a host of documents including the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, Justice Jorda stated “the right
to free legal assistance by counsel does not confer the right to choose one’s counsel.”
b. The Mistake.
The critical error in Van der Spoel’s argument was his failure to base Inglis’
incompetence as an independent ground of appeal. The inadequacy and incompetence of
Counsel Inglis received remarks only in passing. Though the incompetence was noted
and implicitly argued as tantamount to legal denial of counsel, Justice Jorda’s masterful
writing disposed of Inglis’ behavior, ruling on the appeal as a matter of law, without
dwelling on facts. Justice Jorda legally and elegantly sidestepped the painful task of
cutting apart Counsel Inglis and granting Kambanda the new trial to which he was
obviously entitled. Without a full argument that Counsel Inglis was incompetent, and
only an argument that Kambanda was denied his right to a specific counsel Jorda opined;
…in the Appellant’s briefs and oral statements the problem of his counsel’s
inadequacy never figured as an argument, let alone an independent ground of
appeal [emphasis added]. The Appellant’s allegations on this point are at the very
least confused. It is true that in his statement the Appellant did cite, for example,
the insufficient number of meetings with his counsel and the latter’s lack of
interest in and knowledge of the case file[40]. The Appeals Chamber nevertheless
finds that the Appellant has not succeeded in showing his Counsel to be
incompetent on the basis of solid arguments and relevant facts [emphasis
added]. Rather, the Chamber has before it documents proving that counsel for the
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Appellant carried out the functions of his office in the normal manner[citation
omitted]. The Appeals Chamber therefore cannot accept the Appellant’s
allegations and concludes that he has not been able to demonstrate the existence
of special circumstances capable of constituting an exception to the waiver
principle.
c. Strategy and Politics.
There is no right to a “specific counsel” in any context. If Van der Spoel had
argued that Kambanda had no counsel, or that Inglis’s incompetence had deprived him
utterly of counsel, Jorda would have been forced to confront Inglis’s inadequacy and
enter into a de novo factual determination. However, by arguing a specific right to a
specific counsel,cxvi Jorda was able to eradicate Van der Spoel’s best argument as a matter
of law, and not of substantive facts. Van der Spoel committed the strategic error of
allowing Justice Jorda to fight on the ground of his own choosing. By placing the
appellate battlefield in theoretical international law, Van der Spoel, despite his brilliance,
was outgunned.cxvii
With the bulwark of Van der Spoel’s arguments destroyed, the backbone of the
appeal began to break. The secondary grounds of unlawful detention and invalidity of the
guilty plea, were all premised upon the central argument of lack of a specific counsel
(Kambanda was denied his specific counsel, therefore his plea could not have been
informed, or voluntary). Jorda’s succinct disposal of the central premise broke Van der
Spoel’s charge. By allowing Jorda to take ‘the high ground’ and eradicate his central
argument as a matter of law, Van der Spoel’s secondary arguments, powerful though they
were, could not stand up to Jorda’s eviscerating scrutiny. Van der Spoel’s argument was
premised in facts, not the law. Jorda’s opinion was entirely the law, dwelling sporadically
on facts.
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7. The Clash in Counsel Rights.
a. The United States vs. The ICTR.
Thomas Jefferson once cribbed a quote from the “Tryal of Stafford”. Writing
with a Virginian’s intellectual disdain for all things north of Charlottesville, Jefferson
sarcastically noted the common (Yankee?) Judge’s moyens as boni judicis est ampliare
jurisdictionem, or ‘good justice is broad jurisdiction’.cxviii Jefferson, was stalwart in his
distrust of the “despotic” judiciary and vehement in his belief that political corruption
rendered it vulnerable to dictatorial tendencies.cxix His fears were echoed by many
philosophers, both ancient and modern. In the mid 19th century William Carpenter wrote
of the inhumanity of the Chancery Court,cxx while Jefferson’s paradigm of vulnerability
was obviously drawn from Hobbes overarching disdain for most things human and
culpable…particular judges.cxxi Sadly, it seems that, at least in the international arena,
some of this distrust is not unfounded.
Would the plea of Jean Kambanda be accepted in the United States ? In the
United States the Strickland v. Washington rule, holds that the right to counsel is
synonymous with the right to a competent counsel.cxxii But despite the existence of this
claim, U.S. courts are loath to dwell upon the trial behavior of attorneys. In American
jurisprudence, one may go extremely far before having the scarlet letter of
“incompetence” emblazoned upon an attorney’s coattails. The courts have upheld the
sanctity of a proceeding where counsels has become progressively deaf and blind,cxxiii
visibly intoxicated and reeking of alcohol,cxxiv and in one bizarre case arising from
Jackson v. State, where Counsel had in fact “been so overwhelmed and discomfited by his
own inept performance that he was "driven into an infantile hysterical tantrum which
was tantamount to a disturbed child eluding a bully but exclaiming his humiliation while
doing so [he] climaxed his unskilful performance with a serious series of ambidexterous
arm swings and an audible rhythmical cresendo [sic] of, (quote) 'Fiddle Sticks, Awe
Poot'.”cxxv Inglis performance would have been accepted as sub-par, but perhaps a U.S.
Appeals court would also have determined incompetence.
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Could Inglis’s performance be some sort of strategic gamble ? Unfortunately, an
argument that Inglis was attempting to spare Kambanda the threat of multiple life
sentences is inadequate. The ICTR is not a domestic court. The forlorn hope of Parole is
in vain. If Kambanda was to receive one life sentence, his punishment would be identical
to a sentence of forty life sentences. Similarly, why would Inglis rely solely on the guilty
plea as the chief grounds of mitigation. In the case of Gérard Ntakirutimana, a trial
convicted Genocidaire and murderer, the Trial Chamber sentenced him to a mitigated
punishment of twenty-five years.cxxvi Georges Ruggiu, a Belgian who plead guilty to
incitement to genocide was sentenced to two concurrent terms of 12 years.cxxvii Both
Ruggiu and Ntakirutimana had substantial mitigatory facts, including character evidence,
youth, and families. While gambles are prevalent in United States courts, they are
infrequent in the context of the ICTR, where stakes are far greater.
Rationally, if Jean Kambanda was already facing life-imprisonment, what did he
have to lose by pleading not guilty ? Judge Kama of the Trial Chamber noted with
substantial sarcasm that “Both Counsel for Prosecution and Defence have urged the
Chamber to interpret Jean Kambanda’s guilty pleas as a signal of his remorse,
repentance and acceptance of responsibility for his actions. The Chamber is mindful that
remorse is not the only reasonable inference that can be drawn from a guilty plea.” This
would indicate that even with an inference of remorse and repentance, there was no
significant advantage to pleading guilty at the outset…might Kambanda have been better
off in a trial ?
Unfortunately for comparison, this is precisely the sort of “second-guessing” U.S.
Courts are strenuously opposed too. While severe sixth amendment infractions will result
in appellate reversal, it is an infrequent judge who will depart from the norm, and enter
into the mind of a trial lawyer to determine adequacy. A presumption of competence
pervades Sixth amendment jurisprudence,cxxviii and as discussed at length in the American
Jurisprudence Trials Encyclopedia, there is a veritable plethora of errors which did not
result in reversal.cxxix
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b. The Final Analysis.
In the Book of Genesis, Abraham is instructed by God to make a sacrifice of his
only son Issac, as a symbolic gesture of his faith.cxxx Recognizing that only through the
purest sacrifice could both faith and Abraham’s own resolve be secured, the Almighty
duped the Prophet into securing a lasting connection between the Heavens and himself. In
the same vein, Kambanda became the Issac of an unforgiving political climate. His
unsuccessful appeal was a direct result of the need for a sacrificial lamb to calm the rising
tide of Rwandan intransigence and United Nations angst. It was Kambanda himself who
foresaw his own seemingly sacrificial position in a letter to the Registry;
…permit me to cast doubt over certain practices surrounding my trial and the
illusion that some people seem to entertain of having found the sacrificial lamb
which will erase the responsibilities of others in the extermination of the Rwandan
people…
Both Judge Laity Kama and Justice Claude Jorda were painfully cognizant of the
fact that Jean Kambanda, despite his guilt or innocence, symbolized the genocide.
However innocent in the eyes of the law Kambanda might be, however inept and
deplorable his Counsel’s conduct was, Jean Kambanda’s face had become intransigently
imbedded in the Rwandan psyche. A swift and brutal punishment would undoubtedly
provide closure to the thousands of victims of genocide in Rwanda, allowing the country
to take a large step forward toward healing and reconciliation. This brutal but effective
paradigm of symbolism, is prevalent in history and philosophy. The symbol of violence is
destroyed at the behest of the kind master. Indeed, political philosopher Niccolo
Machiavelli noted this rationale in his treatise “The Prince” concerning the execution of
violent Baron Ramiro d'Orco.cxxxi Both Kama and Jorda, exquisitely trained scholars of
law and history would recognize this analogy and the implications of offering up
Kambanda to the bloodthirsty masses.
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Kama and Jorda were also cognizant of a more pressing threat. Since 1999, the
Rwandan people’s dissatisfaction with the ICTR has manifested itself in political
intransigence, protests, and even criticism from the United Nations and abroad.cxxxii In
November of 1999, several months before the appeal, a peaceful assembly of genocide
survivors had implanted itself outside the diminutive ICTR facility, and protested the
release of Attorney Barayagwiza, a genocidal colleague of Kambanda. Rwanda itself had
refused to appear at the United Nations General Assembly until the Barayagwiza issue
was resolved, and had suspended all cooperation with the ICTR forthwith.cxxxiii
At the outset of the ICTR venture, relations between Kigali and the UN’s judicial
forward base were tenuous. Kambanda was ostensibly caught between a Gargantua and
Pantagruel-esque combat. The Rwandan people had long been amazed at the arrogance
of the United Nation’s intervention in their judicial process. It was UN Secretary General
Annan who had refused to augment troops in a last effort to stem the beginnings of the
genocide.cxxxiv Despite the last minute valiant efforts of UN peacekeeper General Romeo
Dallaire, and 500 of his troops, it was the United Nations which allowed the mass
slaughter of innocent men women and children.cxxxv
In order to preserve and strengthen the ties between the UN ICTR, and the
government of Rwanda, and regain the legitimacy they had lost, the Court needed a
sacrifice. Like Issac, blood needed to be spilt in order to preserve what justice was left.
The Prime Minister of Rwanda, a highly recognizable face and symbol of the genocide,
seems perfect to portray as the ICTR’s piece de resistance…and a clear symbol that the
ICTR was “on the side of Rwanda”.
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8. Conclusion:
At the close of many scholarly essays and law review articles, it behooves the
researcher to dwell upon the greater implications of his research. Many authors choose at
this juncture to discuss the ramifications of their thesis upon a field of law. Like a
student’s stone cast into a pond of jurisprudence, these authors write of their ripples upon
the face of the water. Other writers seek to critique the state of the law, and instead
choose to discuss the pond in it’s entirety. Still others disregard the pond and the water,
and instead delve deep into the heart of their thesis, and analyze the stone.
This layman researcher feels there can be no joy in any of these tasks. He
concludes, with some sadness, that Jean Kambanda deserves to remain where he is.
Sacrificial though Kambanda’s fate might seem, the suffering to the people of Rwanda
should it’s injuries be reopened, and her healing wrenched to a halt, would be too
destructive to bear. Too many good men have perished in an effort to halt or heal the
troubles of Rwanda, to allow it’s anguish to resurface. This troubled land where the
peaceful Pygmy Twa once walked, where the last remaining mountain gorillas scatter
amidst gunfire, and orphaned children with bodies torn and mangled by explosives, play
in the street, has endured enough.
Kambanda is, of course, not innocent. Inconsistencies and politics aside, as a
matter of natural justice, he undoubtedly belongs in prison. But as many a Public
Defender might say, “Is this truly the way to go about it ?” Perhaps there is an alternative
route which neither hurts Rwanda, nor sacrifices the natural justice of Jean Kambanda.
Yet in the final analysis, it would take greater minds than I to imagine it.
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The small man sits on the edge of his bed. His dark skin and orange jumpsuit are
searing against the white starched walls of his small cell. Back hunched, eyes
downcast, almost closed, hands on his knees. It is impossible to tell whether he is
asleep, meditating, or merely waiting. The fluorescent tube-light above him
buzzes and snaps, and his fingers remove the black plastic eyeglasses and
massage his tired temples. A bell sounds and the lights in his hallway shut off with
a thump of steel. Jean Kambanda does not move as he is plunged into darkness.

His eyes close on his 1,825th day.
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i

The valiant Agathe Uwiliyingimana was the moderate Hutu Prime Minister who masterminded the peace
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kind and just while distancing himself from the violence at the hands D’Orco. Thus the townspeople of
Romagna awoke one morning to find their hated overseer executed in the middle of the Piazza with a
`block’ (perhaps Alexander’s seal) and a bloody knife beside D’Orco’s butchered carcass).
cxxxii

RWANDAN GOVERNMENT SUSPENDS COOPERATION WITH ICTR, Hirondelle News
Agency, November 6th 1999, available at, www.hirondelle.org. (Last Accessed July 25, 2004).
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RWANDAN GOVERNMENT SUSPENDS COOPERATION WITH ICTR, Hirondelle News
Agency, November 6th 1999, available at, www.hirondelle.org. (Last Accessed July 25, 2004).
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UN CHIEF RUES RWANDAN GENOCIDE RESPONSE, ABC NEWS ONLINE, March 27th 2004,
available at, http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/s1075138.htm. (Last accessed July 26, 2004).
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See, ROMEO DALLAIRE, available at,
http://www.canadians.ca/more/profiles/d/d_romeo_dallaire.htm (Last accessed July 26, 2004); Also see,
THE GENERAL AND THE GENOCIDE, THIRD WORLD TRAVELLER, Winter 2002, available at,
http://www.thirdworldtraveler.com/Heroes/Gen_Romeo_Dallaire.html (Last accessed July 26, 2004)
(General Romeo Dallaire is perhaps the most tragic victim of the Rwandan Genocide. A true hero of
Canada, his soldiers frantically struggled to save thousands of victims of genocide while disobeying orders
from the United Nations Secretary General. Following the massacre of a Belgian bodyguard, his 3,000 man
troop was cut to 500…leaving him in a condition similar to Leonidas at Thermopylae. Through his sole
efforts, General Daillaire prevented the Rwandan Genocide from becoming a modern-day Holocaust. As a
result of his experiences General Dallaire is in a continual state of post-traumatic stress, has attempted
suicide once, and suffered from depression. He now is under the treatment of a therapist.)
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